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ABSTRACT
A battery of recorded spoofing scenarios has been compiled
for evaluating civil Global Positioning System (GPS) sig-
nal authentication techniques. The battery can be consid-
ered the data component of an evolving standard meant to
define the notion of spoof resistance for commercial GPS
receivers. The setup used to record the scenarios is de-
scribed. A detailed description of each scenario reveals
readily detectable anomalies that spoofing detectors could
target to improve GPS security.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication of civil Global Positioning System (GPS)
signals is increasingly a concern. Spoofing attacks, in
which counterfeit GPS signals are generated for the pur-
pose of manipulating a target receiver’s reported position
and time, have been demonstrated with low-cost commer-
cial equipment against a wide variety of GPS receivers [1],
[2], [3], [4]. Such attacks threaten the integrity of financial
transactions, communications, and power grid monitoring
operations that depend on GPS signals for accurate posi-
tioning and timing [5], [6], [7].
Whereas the military GPS waveform was originally de-
signed to be unpredictable and therefore resistant to spoof-
ing [8], the civil GPS waveforms are precisely specified in
publicly-available documents [9]. Also, although not en-
tirely constrained by the signal specifications, the naviga-
tion data messages modulated onto the civil waveforms are
highly predictable. Known signal structure and data bit
predictability make civil GPS signals susceptible to spoof-
ing attacks.
Several researchers have proposed techniques for overlay-
ing unpredictable but verifiable modulations on existing
and future civil GPS signals [10], [11], [12], [13], [14].
These space-segment-side cryptographic techniques offer
the promise of effective globally-available signal authenti-
cation without requiring additional hardware such as mul-
tiple antennas [15] or inertial measurement equipment [16],
which would be impractical in cost-sensitive applications.
Unfortunately, even while many of the technical chal-
lenges of implementing space-segment-side cryptographic
civil GPS authentication have been overcome, daunting
procedural and financial hurdles remain. This sober-
ing reality has lead several researchers to conclude that
efforts to authenticate civil GPS signals over the next
decade should focus on strategies that do not require
support from the GPS space segment. Examples of
such space-segment-independent authentication strategies
can be categorized as (1) receiver-autonomous signal-
processing-oriented techniques, which require no antenna
motion or specialized antenna hardware [17], [18], [19]; (2)
receiver-autonomous antenna-oriented techniques, which
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require antenna motion or specialized antenna hardware
[20], [15], [21]; and (3) techniques that exploit the existing
encrypted military signals to offer civil GPS signal authen-
tication for networked GPS receivers [22], [23], [24], [25].
All existing or proposed civil GPS signal authentication
schemes are premised on hypothesis tests involving statis-
tical models for the authentic and counterfeit GPS signals.
These models make simplifying assumptions that permit
tractable analytical treatment of the detection problem.
In general, the statistics of the null hypothesis (only au-
thentic signals present) are readily verifiable by laboratory
experiment but the statistics of the alternative hypothesis
(spoofing attack underway) are not easily verified. This
is because sophisticated signal generation hardware capa-
ble of code- and carrier-phase-aligned spoofing attacks is
neither commercially available nor straightforward to con-
struct. Thus, for example, experimental validation of the
authentication technique proposed in [22] was limited to
the null hypothesis.
A testbed capable of simulating realistic spoofing attacks is
needed so that the efficacy of proposed civil GPS signal au-
thentication techniques can be experimentally evaluated.
A generic testbed capable of evaluating all known authen-
tication techniques would be prohibitively expensive (e.g.,
it would require a large anechoic chamber for evaluating
receiver-autonomous antenna-oriented techniques). But if
the scope of evaluation is limited to receiver-autonomous
signal-processing-oriented techniques and networked tech-
niques (categories (1) and (3) above), then it is possible
not only to develop an inexpensive testbed but to share the
testbed’s data component so that the tests can be repli-
cated in laboratories across the globe.
This paper presents the Texas Spoofing Test Battery
(TEXBAT), a set of six high-fidelity digital recordings of
live static and dynamic GPS L1 C/A spoofing tests con-
ducted by the Radionavigation Laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin. The battery can be considered
the data component of an evolving standard meant to de-
fine the notion of spoof resistance for civil GPS receivers.
According to this standard, successful detection of or im-
perviousness to all spoofing attacks in TEXBAT, or a fu-
ture version thereof, could be considered sufficient to cer-
tify a civil GPS receiver as spoof resistant, as suggested
in recent congressional testimony [26]. In what follows,
the setup and procedure used to record the various TEX-
BAT scenarios is described. Thereafter, each scenario is
detailed and analyzed, revealing obvious anomalies that
future GPS receivers could be designed to detect.
BANDWIDTH AND QUANTIZATION CONSID-
ERATIONS
The initial version of TEXBAT, as presented in this pa-
per, is focused solely on evaluating techniques for authen-
ticating the civil GPS L1 C/A signals. Accordingly, one
might argue that the TEXBAT recordings need only cap-
ture the main lobe of the C/A power spectrum, which is
approximately 2-MHz wide and, due to the C/A code’s
sinc2(f/fc)-shaped power profile for chip rate fc, contains
more than 90% of the total C/A signal power.
But a narrow 2-MHz bandwidth would be inadequate to
support evaluation of authentication techniques such as
the Vestigial Signal Defense [18] that are based on a de-
tailed characterization of the broadcast GPS-signals, a
characterization that captures not only the signals’ the-
oretical structure but also any filtering or other effects im-
posed by the transmitter. For these techniques, a wide
radio frequency capture bandwidth is necessary to prevent
signal distortion that could be interpreted as spoofing and
lead to false alarms. A wideband recording is also neces-
sary to support evaluation of GPS signal authentication
techniques that rely on the presence of the military P(Y)
signals, whose main lobe is 10 times wider than that of the
C/A signals.
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Fig. 1. Power spectral density estimate of the GPS signal corre-
sponding to PRN 31 as received on 22 April, 2003 by the Stanford
46-meter-diameter radio telescope (original data courtesy of Dennis
Akos). The complex sampling rate of the digitized data was 46.08
Msps.
To appreciate the richness of data in a wide band around
L1, consider Fig. 1, which shows a power spectral density
estimate of the GPS signal corresponding to pseudoran-
dom number (PRN) code 31 as received in April 2003 by a
high-gain (52 dBi) radio telescope. Besides a gentle asym-
metry, the spectrum reveals that the full bandwidth of the
transmitted GPS signals is approximately 30 MHz (the fil-
tering effects visible beyond 30 MHz are likely dominated
by the satellite’s transmission hardware rather than the
recording equipment, which was sampling at 46.08 Msps).
Therefore, a bandwidth exceeding 30-MHz would be re-
quired to capture all C/A signal information that may be
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relevant to authentication.
However, recognizing a practical need to minimize the size
of recorded files, the recordings in TEXBAT were limited
to a complex sampling rate of 25 Msps, which, with the
high-quality front-end filtering employed, provides a flat
frequency response over a 20-MHz bandwidth around L1.
With a 20-MHz captured bandwidth, only 0.04 dB of C/A
signal power is lost and filtering effects on the C/A signal
due to the TEXBAT recording hardware are negligible.
Given its civil GPS focus, it is not necessary for TEXBAT
to avoid filtering (distorting) the P(Y) signals, which, ac-
cording to Fig. 1 would require a bandwidth exceeding
30 MHz. Instead, TEXBAT need only provide enough
P(Y) signal power so that the networked authentication
techniques discussed in [22], [23], [24], [25], which rely on
cross-correlation with the P(Y) signals, can function prop-
erly. A 20-MHz bandwidth preserves all but 0.44 dB of the
P(Y) spectral power, which should be adequate to support
such techniques.
Now consider quantization. As discussed in [27], quanti-
zation causes bandpass signal power to “spill” out of the
band of the original, unquantized signal. This has approx-
imately the same effect on GPS signals as reducing the
signal power and increasing the broad-band noise power.
The net result of these two effects is a decrease in each
received signal’s carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N0). Thus, one
consideration when choosing the number of quantization
levels N for TEXBAT recordings is to determine an ac-
ceptable loss in C/N0 for the authentic and counterfeit
signals.
Hegarty shows in [28] that when the captured bandwidth is
wide compared with the main sinc2(f/fc) lobe, the C/N0
loss for N -level quantization is 2.06 dB for N = 2 (1 bit),
0.64 dB for N = 4 (2 bit), 0.26 dB for N = 8 (3 bit),
and 0.14 dB for N = 16 (4 bit). Thus, if maintaining
signal C/N0 were the only imperative, no more than 4-bit
quantization would practically be required.
But TEXBAT quantization must also accommodate a wide
dynamic range. In potential TEXBAT scenarios, the dif-
ference in power between the authentic and counterfeit sig-
nal ensembles could be large. In these cases a high num-
ber of quantization levels makes it possible to recover the
weaker signals from the data, which may be a key strategy
for some signal authentication technique. Therefore, TEX-
BAT complex samples were recorded with 16-bit quan-
tization to ensure a more-than-adequately-wide dynamic
range.
RECORDING SETUP
This section discusses the TEXBAT recording setup, which
is depicted graphically in Fig. 2. Each principal compo-
nent of the setup will be treated in turn.
The GPS Spoofer
The central component of the TEXBAT recording setup is
the University of Texas (UT) GPS spoofing device, whose
design and operation are described in [1], [29], [30], [3],
[4]. The latest version of the UT spoofing device is much
improved compared to the original version introduced in
[1]. For example, the current version has greater through-
put: it is capable of simultaneously tracking and spoofing
up to 14 GPS L1 C/A signals while continuing to perform
background acquisition of emerging GPS satellite signals.
Other key features of the spoofer relevant to TEXBAT are
phase alignment, navigation data bit prediction, variable
output attenuation, and noise padding.
Phase Alignment
The UT spoofer receives authentic civil GPS L1 C/A and
GPS L2C signals and generates counterfeit GPS L1 C/A
signals that are closely code-phase aligned with their au-
thentic counterparts. The spoofer is currently not capable
of generating signals that are carrier-phase aligned with
the authentic signals at the location of a target receiver;
indeed, it appears that such carrier-phase alignment is a
practical impossibility for any spoofing device except un-
der controlled laboratory conditions in view of the precise
(cm-level) relative position knowledge required.
But neither do the carrier phases of the UT spoofer’s sig-
nals wander arbitrarily with respect to those of the authen-
tic signals. As the spoofer attempts to induce a position or
timing deviation in the target receiver by shifting the code
phase of its counterfeit signals, it can adopt either of two
strategies with respect to carrier phase generation. In the
default mode, the rate of change of its signals’ carrier phase
is proportional to the rate of change of the corresponding
code phase. If τ˙ and φ˙ represent the rate of change of code
phase and carrier phase, in seconds per second and cycles
per second, respectively, then in the spoofer’s default mode
these are related by
φ˙ = fcτ˙
where fc is the GPS L1 frequency in Hz.
In an alternative mode, the so-called frequency lock mode,
the UT spoofer maintains approximately fixed whatever
initial phase offset arises between its counterfeit signals
and the authentic signals, and continues to maintain this
fixed carrier phase offset even while it shifts the code phase
of its counterfeit signals to induce a position or timing devi-
ation in the target receiver. This ability to lock the relative
(counterfeit-to-authentic) carrier phase even while shift-
ing the relative (counterfeit-to-authentic) code phase en-
ables the spoofer to evade some spoofing detection strate-
gies that are designed to watch for the rapid amplitude
variations caused by interacting authentic and counterfeit
phasors of comparable magnitude when the authentic and
counterfeit φ˙ values differ.
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Fig. 2. Diagram of the TEXBAT recording setup.
Navigation Data Bit Prediction
To initialize an attack with an induced position, veloc-
ity, and timing (PVT) solution that is indistinguishable
from the authentic PVT solution, it is not enough for the
spoofer to achieve code-phase alignment with the authen-
tic signals, it must also align its simulated navigation data
bit stream with that of the authentic signals. But, due to
processing, geometrical, and cable delays, it is impossible
for the spoofer to read the value of the incoming navigation
data bits off the air and immediately replay them so that
they arrive at the target receiver perfectly aligned with the
authentic data bits and having the correct value over the
entire length of each data bit. Indeed, this impossibility
is precisely what makes navigation message authentication
effective for GPS signal authentication, as discussed in [13]
and [14].
Rather than read the navigation data bits off the air for im-
mediate replay, the UT spoofer takes advantage of the near
perfect predictability of the navigation data that modulate
the GPS L1 C/A signals. Over the course of a 12.5-minute
navigation data superframe, the spoofer collects the data
bits corresponding to each tracked GPS satellite. Alterna-
tively, the spoofer can obtain the 12.5-minute superframe
for each satellite from its control computer. Thereafter,
the spoofer compensates for its ∼5-ms processing delay
and for geometrical and cable delays by predicting the
value of the navigation data stream slightly more than 5
ms in advance. In this way, the spoofer can achieve meter-
level alignment between its signals and the authentic ones
at the location of the target receiver.
Variable Output Attenuation
Before exiting the spoofer, counterfeit signals pass through
a digital attenuator with a 31.5-dB range whose attenu-
ation value can be set dynamically by the control com-
puter. This enables the spoofer to finely adjust the so-
called spoofer power advantage, or the ratio of the power
of the counterfeit signal ensemble to the power of the au-
thentic signal ensemble as seen by the target receiver.
Noise Padding
The analog signal ensemble generated by the UT spoofer
contains only a modest amount of noise interference. In
other words, the native noise floor of the output signal en-
semble is low—much lower than the noise floor present at
the output of a high-quality GPS antenna’s low-noise am-
plifier (LNA). To appreciate the consequence of this low
native noise floor, consider that if the UT spoofer is config-
4
ured to generate only a single output GPS L1 C/A signal
(corresponding to a single PRN code), the native C/N0
of the output signal exceeds 60 dB-Hz. Of course, when
more simulated GPS signals are added to the ensemble, the
C/N0 associated with any one of the signals drops because
the other signals act as interference.
A low native noise floor would not be a problem for the
spoofer if it were always configured to match the power of
each counterfeit signal to that of the corresponding authen-
tic signal at the location of the target receiver’s antenna,
or in the case of a direct cable injection test, at the radio
frequency (RF) input to the target receiver. In this case,
the noise floor observed by the target receiver is essentially
determined by the LNA in the receiver’s antenna or in the
receiver’s own front-end.
But in many cases it may be advantageous for the spoofer
to significantly overpower the authentic signals; for exam-
ple, to eliminate interaction with them. Or it may be
necessary to directly inject a powerful spoofing signal en-
semble into the RF front-end of a receiver under test. In
these cases, if the spoofer is generating less than ∼13 sim-
ulated signals, the C/N0 values registered by the target
receiver for each received GPS signal become unnaturally
high, owing to the low native noise floor of the spoofer’s
output ensemble. (When generating 13 or more signals,
the signals’ mutual interference is sufficient to establish an
appropriate noise floor from the perspective of any partic-
ular signal.)
To prevent unnaturally high C/N0 values in these cases,
the UT spoofer can be configured to add a variable level
of “noise padding”—broadband interference—to its own
output ensemble. In this way, the spoofer can dictate a
maximum C/N0 value for each of its output signals even
while transmitting at high power.
Receive Antenna
Prior to and during a spoofing attack, the spoofer draws in
authentic GPS signals from a reference antenna. For the
static scenarios in TEXBAT the reference antenna was a
Trimble Geodetic Zephyr II antenna located on the WRW
building on the campus of the University of Texas. For
the dynamic scenarios, the antenna was a vehicle-mounted
Antcom 53G1215A-XT-1 antenna. The reference antenna
output is also combined with the spoofer output and fed
into the RF signal capture system as the authentic signal
stream.
Reference Clock
The GPS spoofer is fed with a stable reference from an ex-
ternal 10-MHz oven controlled crystal oscillator (OCXO).
An identical oscillator (not shown in Fig. 2) is used to
drive the mixer and digitizer in the RF signal capture sys-
tem.
RF Signal Capture System
A National Instruments PXIe-5663 6.6 GHz vector sig-
nal analyzer (VSA) was used to downmix and digitize the
combined authentic and spoofing signals in each TEXBAT
spoofing scenario. In accordance with the conclusions of
the earlier section on bandwidth and quantization consid-
erations, the VSA was configured to capture complex 16-
bit samples at a rate of 25 Msps. The digitized data were
then stored to disc.
RF Signal Replay System
The TEXBAT scenarios can be replayed through a Na-
tional Instruments PXIe-5673E 6.6 GHz vector signal gen-
erator (VSG). Other VSGs may also be capable of replay-
ing the data, which are stored simply as binary 16-bit in-
phase and quadrature samples. A separate XML file ac-
companying each scenario’s binary data file provides all
parameters relevant to data replay.
RECORDING PROCEDURE
Contrary to what Fig. 2 implies, the authentic signal
stream in the recorded TEXBAT scenarios did not come
directly from the receive antenna. Instead, two “clean”
(spoof-free) data sets were initially recorded, one static
and one dynamic. The clean static data set was replayed
through the NI VSG to serve as the authentic signal stream
for TEXBAT scenarios 1-4. The clean dynamic data set
was used similarly for scenarios 5 and 6. The clean dy-
namic data set was originally recorded from an antenna
mounted atop a vehicle traveling in Austin, TX. Both clean
data sets are provided as part of TEXBAT. This proce-
dure for generating the TEXBAT recordings ensures that
users of TEXBAT can observe the behavior of their sys-
tems under nominal unspoofed conditions and then repeat
the test controlling for all variables except for the presence
of spoofing.
Users of TEXBAT data will observe the effects of up to
three different clocks in the carrier phase time histories
produced by their receiver under test: (1) the oscillator
that drove the VSA when recording the original clean data
set, (2) the oscillator that drives the VSG when the TEX-
BAT user replays a scenario, and (3) the reference oscil-
lator of the user’s receiver under test. A stable external
OCXO reference oscillator was used to drive the VSA and
VSG at each stage of recording and playback to ensure
that clock effects on the recorded TEXBAT data would
be mild. Most likely, the clock effects imprinted on the
data by the recording hardware will be less significant than
those imprinted by the receiver under test. Note that dur-
ing a TEXBAT scenario recording the VSG replaying the
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authentic signal stream and the VSA recording the com-
bined spoofed and authentic signal streams are driven by
the same external oscillator; thus, this stage of the record-
ing procedure does not introduce any additional clock ef-
fects.
Each of the six TEXBAT spoofing scenarios is approxi-
mately 7 minutes (420 seconds) long. No spoofing signals
were injected during the first 100 seconds or so to allow
time for receivers under test to brace for the attack by ac-
quiring all authentic signals present and obtaining a clean
navigation and timing solution.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF TEXBAT SCE-
NARIOS
TEXBAT includes six spoofing attack scenarios plus two
clean data sets on which the scenarios are based. Ta-
ble I summarizes the essential parameters of each of the
six scenarios. “Spoofing Type” indicates the dimension
along which the spoofing occurs, whether position or time.
If position, the spoofer gradually induces an erroneous
600-meter position offset in the target receiver’s perceived
Earth-centered, Earth-fixed (ECEF) position coordinates;
if time, it gradually induces an erroneous 2-µs (600-meter-
equivalent) offset in the receiver’s perceived GPS time.
“Platform Mobility” indicates whether the GPS naviga-
tion solution derived from the underlying clean data set
is static or dynamic. Scenarios 1-4 are static scenarios
based on the clean static data set; scenarios 5 and 6 are
dynamic scenarios based on the clean dynamic data set.
“Power Adv.” indicates the spoofer’s power advantage,
or the ratio of the power of the counterfeit signal ensem-
ble to the power of the authentic signal ensemble as seen
by the target receiver. Power advantage is expressed in
dB. “Frequency Lock” indicates whether the spoofer was
configured to operate in its frequency lock mode or in its
default unlocked mode, as described previously. “Noise
Padding” indicates whether the spoofer was configured to
noise-pad its output signals (“Enabled”) or transmit with-
out additional noise padding (“Disabled”). “Size” indi-
cates the size of the binary file in which the scenario data
are recorded, in GB.
To facilitate development of spoofing detection techniques,
a discussion of each TEXBAT scenario follows. The re-
sponse of a particular GPS L1 C/A receiver, the science-
grade UT/Cornell/ASTRA CASES sensor [31], [32], [33],
to each scenario’s spoofing attack will be presented graphi-
cally. It will become clear that each scenario offers obvious
clues indicating the presence of spoofing.
Scenario 1: Static Switch
Scenario 1 involves a near-instantaneous switch from an
exclusively authentic signal stream to an exclusively coun-
terfeit stream. This scenario is meant to represent a case
where the spoofer operator has physical access to the tar-
get receiver’s antenna and can cleanly substitute, either by
blocking the authentic signals or by cable switch-out, the
counterfeit signals for the authentic ones.
The counterfeit signal ensemble in Scenario 1 is much
weaker than the (amplified) authentic ensemble, so the
switch event is obviously evident in the time history of nor-
malized signal power at about the 100-second mark in Fig.
3. Clearly, an in-band power indicator would have easily
detected a disruption in the antenna environment or RF
chain in this case. But it should be borne in mind that the
spoofer easily could have matched the pre- and post-switch
in-band power levels; thus, in-band power is not a robust
spoofing indicator for a case involving a switch attack.
Figure 4 shows that after the switch event the C/N0 of a
representative GPS signal falls by several dB (top panel).
A simple spoofing detection strategy could be designed to
trigger on this discontinuity. However, it should be noted
that the spoofer could have reduced or eliminated the dis-
continuity by decreasing the level of its noise padding.
Moreover, there is no indication either in the Doppler time
history fD(t) or in the phase trauma flag that spoofing is
present.
Figure 5 shows the time history of the receiver ECEF po-
sition deviation from the mean. Comparing the blue and
green traces, it is clear that no reliable indicator of spoof-
ing can be extracted from the navigation solution alone
in this case. Similarly, Fig. 6 shows that the receiver
clock offset rate ˙δtR (bottom panel) would not be a reli-
able indicator in this case. The receiver clock offset δtR
(top panel) shows a ∼10-meter discontinuity at the switch
event. This indicates that there was a ∼30-ns common-
mode error (advance) in the spoofer’s alignment with the
authentic signals. This may seem like a telltale signature
on which a detector could trigger, but it is not a reliable
indicator given that there is nothing inherently difficult in
compensating for this common code phase advance inside
the spoofer.
It should be pointed out that even though in this scenario
the spoofer did not attempt to drag the target receiver off
in time, it well could have, and at a rate gradual enough
to be within the drift envelope of the target’s reference
oscillator.
Figure 7 shows, for a short interval spanning the switch
event, the navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of
0.1 C/A code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt
tap. These in-phase (top panel) and quadrature (bottom
panel) strip charts are highly informative for spoofing de-
tection. In fact, it can be shown that these data (at
an arbitrarily short accumulation interval and including
the data bit modulation) and a total in-band power mea-
surement together constitute the complete information set
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TABLE I
Texas Spoofing Test Battery: Scenario Summary
Scenario Designation Spoofing Platform Power Frequency Noise Size
Type Mobility Adv. (dB) Lock Padding (GB)
1: Static Switch N/A Static N/A Unlocked Enabled 43
2: Static Overpowered Time Push Time Static 10 Unlocked Disabled 42.5
3: Static Matched-Power Time Push Time Static 1.3 Locked Disabled 42.6
4: Static Matched-Power Pos. Push Position Static 0.4 Locked Disabled 42.6
5: Dynamic Overpowered Time Push Time Dynamic 9.9 Unlocked Disabled 38.9
6: Dynamic Matched-Power Pos. Push Position Dynamic 0.8 Locked Disabled 38.9
available for GPS signal authentication. It is obvious from
Fig. 7 that a disruption began between 90 and 100 seconds.
Not only did the amplitude of the in-phase accumulations
change, but also the correlation shape changed slightly.
Moreover, a Fourier transform of the complex time history
from any single tap would reveal the post-attack emergence
of anomalous frequencies in the complex accumulations.
Unfortunately, in the case of a switch attack, a sophisti-
cated spoofer could be designed to avoid causing these and
other distortions of the complex correlation function. The
absence of interaction between the authentic and coun-
terfeit signals allows the spoofer to focus on refining its
switchover procedure and the shape and behavior of its in-
duced complex correlation function. This implies that the
switch attack is an especially potent one for the spoofer.
Fortunately, analysis of subsequent scenarios will reveal
that, for attacks in which both authentic and counterfeit
signals are present at significant levels, it is exceedingly
challenging for the spoofer to prevent distortion of the
complex correlation function due to interaction between
the authentic and counterfeit signals.
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Fig. 3. Scenario 1: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
Scenario 2: Static Overpowered Time Push
In Scenario 2, the spoofer executes a timing attack with
a 10-db power advantage over the authentic signal ensem-
ble. The sequence of figures depicting the effects of the
attack is the same as for Scenario 1 (this is also true for
all subsequent scenarios).
Attacking with overwhelming power is to the spoofer’s ad-
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Fig. 4. Scenario 1: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the
receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 5. Scenario 1: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
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Fig. 6. Scenario 1: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 7. Scenario 1: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
2-second coherent summations.
vantage in the sense that the authentic signals are forced
into the noise floor by the action of the target receiver’s
automatic gain control function. Thus, the weak vesti-
gial authentic signals do not interact significantly with the
counterfeit signals, which implies that a high-power at-
tack’s correlation signature may look no more suspicious
than that of a switch attack.
However, the target receiver can readily detect a high-
power attack by monitoring its in-band received power.
Figure 8 makes this evident: the spoofer’s 10-dB power
advantage reveals itself as an abrupt 8-dB increase in the
in-band power. While it is true that the spoofer could
slow the rate at which it increases power (i.e., make the
slope in Fig. 8 shallower), such a gradual increase would
expose the spoofer to detection by techniques looking for
interaction between the authentic and counterfeit signals.
Hence, in a non-switch attack the spoofer can be effectively
“boxed in” by a combination of in-band power monitoring
and complex correlation function monitoring.
Figure 9 shows that the spoofer in Scenario 2 significantly
increased the C/N0 of a representative GPS signal as it
initiated its attack. There is also an obvious deviation in
fD due to the spoofer’s effecting the time spoofing in its
default frequency unlocked mode. As it moves the tar-
get receiver off in time, the spoofer adjusts the induced
Doppler fD to be appropriately proportional to the rate
of change in the common code phase. It is interesting to
note in the lower panel in Fig. 9 that both the initial
takeover (at around 80 seconds) and the initial time pull-
off (at around 115 seconds) disturb the composite carrier
phase enough to trigger the target receiver’s phase trauma
indicator.
Because Scenario 2 involves only a time attack, there is
little effect on the target receiver’s ECEF position history,
though, as with the phase trauma indicator, there is some
disturbance at initial capture and initial time pull-off (Fig.
10).
The profile of the timing attack is evident in Fig. 11. In its
frequency unlocked mode, the spoofer induces a common
offset in fD on all signals. The offset follows a trapezoidal
trajectory, which translates to a trapezoidal excursion in
˙δtR (lower panel) that is obviously well outside the en-
velope of this particular receiver’s native clock variations.
But with a shallower acceleration profile, or a less-stable
receiver clock, the variation in ˙δtR may not appear anoma-
lous.
As was true for Scenario 1, the complex correlation func-
tion plots (Fig. 12) reveal a great deal about Scenario
2. Most striking is the oscillation that begins just after
110 seconds. This has an intuitive explanation. Because
frequency lock is disabled, the relative (counterfeit to au-
thentic) phase angle begins to ramp, following a profile
proportional to the ramp of δtR in the upper panel of Fig.
11. Consequently, the composite counterfeit and authentic
signal phasor, which is the one actually being tracked by
the receiver’s phase lock loop, begins to experience am-
plitude variations: the counterfeit and authentic phasors
interact now constructively, now destructively. Note that
a strong oscillation is evident even though the counterfeit
phasor is 3.1 times longer (10 time more powerful) than
the authentic one.
Clearly, such an oscillation raises suspicion of a spoofing
attack. It is, however, not conclusive given than strong
natural multipath signals tend to cause a similar oscillation
[18], [34]. Moreover, the spoofer can prevent the telltale
oscillation by decoupling the code and carrier phase in the
8
signals it generates, as the UT spoofer does in its frequency
lock mode.
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Fig. 8. Scenario 2: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
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Fig. 9. Scenario 2: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the
receiver’s spoofed response.
Scenario 3: Static Matched-Power Time Push
Scenario 3 is identical to Scenario 2 except that the
spoofer’s power advantage is reduced from 10 dB to 1.3
dB and the spoofer’s frequency lock mode is enabled. The
reduction in power advantage is evident in Fig. 13, which
shows that the 1.3 dB power advantage leads to an in-
crease in in-band power of only 2.3 dB, compared to 8 dB
for Scenario 2. Scenario 3 is meant to represent a case
in which the spoofer attempts to approximately match its
ensemble power to that of the authentic signals.
Figures 15 to 17 reveal the consequences of having fre-
quency lock enabled and nearly-matched counterfeit and
authentic signal ensemble power. The absence of phase
trauma events and anomalous excursions in fD and ˙δtR
reflect the fact that the spoofer’s induced carrier phase
is well-behaved—approximately locked at some relative
phase angle to the corresponding authentic signal’s car-
rier phase. However, Figs. 14 and 17 make it clear that
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Fig. 10. Scenario 2: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
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Fig. 11. Scenario 2: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
the UT spoofer’s frequency locking behavior is not per-
fect: there exists a slight residual differential Doppler that
causes the counterfeit and authentic phasors, now approx-
imately matched in magnitude, to slowly rotate with re-
spect to each other. This slow beating gives rise to sus-
tained intervals of constructive (high C/N0) and destruc-
tive (low C/N0) interference whose C/N0 values differ by
10 dB. Such beating could only be ascribed to multipath
in a narrow set of circumstances in which the direct-path
signal has been attenuated and the multipath and direct
signals exhibit a slight differential Doppler. But such cases
could be distinguished from the present one because in the
former the in-band signal power would not be expected to
rise.
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Fig. 12. Scenario 2: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
2-second coherent summations.
Note that although the slow beating in this case is an ar-
tifact of the UT spoofer’s inability to achieve perfect fre-
quency lock, it remains true that when counterfeit and au-
thentic signals are approximately matched in power the
spoofer can hardly avoid some kind of constructive or
destructive interference. This follows from the spoofer’s
presumed inability to precisely control the initial relative
counterfeit-to-authentic carrier phase.
Note also that although in this scenario the spoofer suc-
cessfully induced a 600-meter (∼2-µs) offset in δtR in the
particular receiver targeted, the pulloff was not smooth.
Without the benefit of overwhelming signal power and
without the frequency aiding from the target receiver’s
phase lock loop (a consequence of the spoofer’s having fre-
quency lock enabled), the spoofer struggles to induce the
target receiver’s delay lock loops to track its signals instead
of the authentic ones. The large excursions in ECEF posi-
tion (Fig. 15) and the rough initial departure of δtR (upper
panel of Fig. 16) are evidence of a struggle between the
counterfeit and authentic signals for control of the target
receiver’s delay lock loops.
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Fig. 13. Scenario 3: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
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Fig. 14. Scenario 3: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the
receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 15. Scenario 3: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
Scenario 4: Static Matched-Power Position Push
Scenario 4 is identical to Scenario 3 except that the
spoofer’s power advantage has been reduced still further
(from 1.2 to 0.4 dB) and the spoofing drives the target re-
ceiver off in position instead of time—specifically, an offset
of 600 m in the Z-coordinate.
The spoofer’s near-zero-dB power advantage is evident in
two ways in Fig. 18. First, the steady-state increase in in-
band power is low—less than 2 dB. Second, there arises an
oscillation in the in-band power during initial pulloff. This
oscillation reflects a substantial coherence in the spoofing
signals: their constructive and destructive interaction with
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Fig. 16. Scenario 3: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 17. Scenario 3: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
4-second coherent summations.
the authentic signals tends to occur in unison. An oscil-
lation is also manifest in Scenario 3’s in-band power (Fig.
13), but its amplitude is less because the counterfeit and
authentic signal powers are not so evenly matched.
Even more than with Scenario 3, the spoofer’s low power
advantage and the approximately locked counterfeit-to-
authentic carrier phase make pulloff of the target receiver’s
delay lock loops a challenge. In fact, the persistent offset
in ∆X (Fig. 15) and δtR (Fig. 16), despite the spoofing
being solely in the Z dimension, suggests that at least one
of the target receiver’s channels remained locked to the au-
thentic signal in this case. This again highlights that for
the spoofer a low power advantage is perilous.
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Fig. 18. Scenario 4: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
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Fig. 19. Scenario 4: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the
receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 20. Scenario 4: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
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Fig. 21. Scenario 4: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 22. Scenario 4: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
4-second coherent summations.
Scenario 5: Dynamic Overpowered Time Push
Scenario 5 is similar to Scenario 2 except that the receiver
platform is dynamic rather than static and the spoofer’s
frequency lock feature is disabled. The target receiver’s
ability to defend itself from a spoofing attack is much
eroded in this case. While as before the spoofer’s inel-
egant takeover leaves behind telltale variations in C/N0
and some phase trauma, the target receiver, considering
its dynamic platform, may easily confuse these for natu-
ral phenomena. The challenge of spoofing detection on a
dynamic platform is to distinguish spoofing effects from
natural fading and multipath.
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Fig. 23. Scenario 5: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
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Fig. 24. Scenario 5: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows
the receiver’s spoofed response. The unspoofed and spoofed phase
trauma indicators have different amplitudes only for visual clarity.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
−2000
−1000
0
1000
∆ 
X
 (m
ete
rs)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
−1000
−500
0
500
∆ 
Y
 (m
ete
rs)
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
−1000
0
1000
∆ 
Z 
(m
ete
rs)
Time in seconds
Fig. 25. Scenario 5: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
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Fig. 26. Scenario 5: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 27. Scenario 5: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
4-second coherent summations.
Scenario 6: Dynamic Matched-Power Position
Push
Scenario 6 is similar to Scenario 4 except that the re-
ceiver platform is dynamic rather than static. Again, the
spoofer’s modest power advantage and frequency lock set-
ting complicate its takeover of the target receiver’s track-
ing loops, forcing it to leave behind clues of its presence.
To defend itself, the target receiver must distinguish these
clues from similar variations that arise naturally on a dy-
namic platform.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
−1
0
1
2
3
4
Time in seconds
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 P
ow
er
 (d
B)
Fig. 28. Scenario 6: Time history of normalized power in a 2-MHz
band centered at GPS L1.
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Fig. 29. Scenario 6: Time history of C/N0 (top panel), fD (center
panel), and the phase trauma indicator (bottom panel) correspond-
ing to a single signal being spoofed. In each panel, the green trace
shows the receiver’s unspoofed response and the blue trace shows
the receiver’s spoofed response. The unspoofed and spoofed phase
trauma indicators have different amplitudes only for visual clarity.
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Fig. 30. Scenario 6: Time history of receiver ECEF position devia-
tion from mean. In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s
unspoofed response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed
response.
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Fig. 31. Scenario 6: Time history of δtR (top panel) and ˙δtR (bottom
panel). In each panel, the green trace shows the receiver’s unspoofed
response and the blue trace shows the receiver’s spoofed response.
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Fig. 32. Scenario 6: Navigation-data-free output time history of 21
complex correlation taps uniformly spaced at an interval of 0.1 C/A
code chips and centered at the receiver’s prompt tap. In-phase (top
panel) and quadrature (bottom panel) accumulations are based on
4-second coherent summations.
CONCLUSIONS
The Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT), a set of six
high-fidelity digital recordings of live static and dynamic
GPS L1 C/A spoofing tests, was introduced as a data set
for the development and evaluation of civil GPS signal au-
thentication techniques. TEXBAT can also be thought of
as the data component of a draft standard for defining the
notion of spoofing resistance for civil GPS receivers. The
TEXBAT recording setup was designed to ensure that the
recorded scenarios are, insofar as is practical, a faithful
representation of the corresponding live attacks. The ef-
fects of each of the six scenarios on a particular target re-
ceiver were analyzed, revealing numerous anomalies that
could be targeted for spoofing detection. In this regard,
the target receiver’s complex correlation function is espe-
cially fraught with spoofing clues.
An admixture of counterfeit and authentic signals of com-
parable power inevitably leads to interaction between the
two, which, if the target receiver can distinguish from
natural multipath and fading effects, is a useful spoofing
indicator. In-band power monitoring effectively limits a
spoofer’s ability to eliminate interaction by increasing its
signal power advantage. Hence, in a non-switch attack
the spoofer can be effectively “boxed in” by a combina-
tion of in-band power monitoring and complex correlation
function monitoring. This is especially effective for static
receivers because the nominal local multipath and fading
environment can be characterized and thus distinguished
from spoofing.
ENDNOTE
The University of Texas Radionavigation Laboratory has
teamed with National Instruments to offer TEXBAT
as a free data set to researchers, manufacturers, and
government entities wishing to develop and test GPS
L1 C/A signal authentication techniques. Please visit
radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu and click on “RNL Public
Data Sets” for information on how to dowload TEXBAT.
References
[1] Humphreys, T. E., Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M. L., O’Hanlon,
B. W., and Kintner, Jr., P. M., “Assessing the spoofing threat:
development of a portable GPS civilian spoofer,” Proceedings
of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of Navigation, Savannah,
GA, 2008.
[2] Shepard, D. and Humphreys, T. E., “Characterization of Re-
ceiver Response to a Spoofing Attack,” Proceedings of the
ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of Navigation, Portland, Oregon,
2011.
[3] Shepard, D., Bhatti, J., and Humphreys, T., “Evaluation of
Smart Grid and Civilian UAV Vulnerability to GPS Spoofing
Attacks,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of
Navigation, Nashville, Tennessee, 2012.
[4] Shepard, D. P., Humphreys, T. E., and Fansler, A. A., “Evalu-
ation of the Vulnerability of Phasor Measurement Units to GPS
Spoofing Attacks,” International Journal of Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection, 2012, to be published.
[5] Anon., “Vulnerability assessment of the transportation infras-
tructure relying on the Global Positioning System,” Tech. rep.,
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, 2001.
[6] Anon., “Global Positioning System Impact To Critical Civil In-
frastructure (GICCI),” Tech. rep., Mission Assurance Division,
Naval Surface Warfare Center, 2009.
[7] Kroener, U. and Dimc, F., “Hardening of civilian GNSS track-
ers,” Proceedings of the 3rd GNSS Vulnerabilities and Solutions
Conference, Royal Institute of Navigation, Krk Island, Croatia,
Sept. 2010.
[8] Spilker, Jr., J. J., Global Positioning System: Theory and Ap-
plications, chap. 3: GPS Signal Structure and Theoretical Per-
14
formance, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Washington, D.C., 1996, pp. 57–119.
[9] Anon., “Global Positioning System Directorate Systems Engi-
neering and Integration Interface Specification IS-GPS-200F,”
Tech. rep., 2011, http://www.gps.gov/technical/icwg/.
[10] Scott, L., “Anti-spoofing and authenticated signal architectures
for civil navigation systems,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS
Meeting , Institute of Navigation, Portland, Oregon, 2003, pp.
1542–1552.
[11] Hein, G., Kneissl, F., Avila-Rodriguez, J.-A., and Wallner, S.,
“Authenticating GNSS: Proofs against spoofs, Part 2,” Inside
GNSS , September/October 2007, pp. 71–78.
[12] Pozzobon, O., “Keeping the Spoofs Out: Signal Authentica-
tion Services for Future GNSS,” Inside GNSS , Vol. 6, No. 3,
May/June 2011, pp. 48–55.
[13] Wesson, K., Rothlisberger, M., and Humphreys, T. E., “Prac-
tical Cryptographic Civil GPS Signal Authentication,” NAVI-
GATION, Journal of the Institute of Navigation, Vol. 59, No. 3,
2012, pp. 177–193.
[14] Humphreys, T. E., “Detection Strategy for Cryptographic
GNSS Anti-Spoofing,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and
Electronic Systems, 2011, to be published; available at http:
//radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/detstrat.
[15] Montgomery, P. Y., Humphreys, T. E., and Ledvina, B. M., “A
Multi-Antenna Defense: Receiver-Autonomous GPS Spoofing
Detection,” Inside GNSS , Vol. 4, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 40–46.
[16] White, N., Maybeck, P., and DeVilbiss, S., “Detection of in-
terference/jamming and spoofing in a DGPS-aided inertial sys-
tem,” Aerospace and Electronic Systems, IEEE Transactions
on, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1998, pp. 1208–1217.
[17] Ledvina, B. M., Bencze, W. J., Galusha, B., and Miller, I., “An
In-Line Anti-Spoofing Module for Legacy Civil GPS Receivers,”
Proceedings of the ION ITM , San Diego, CA, Jan. 2010.
[18] Wesson, K., Shepard, D., Bhatti, J., and Humphreys, T. E., “An
Evaluation of the Vestigial Signal Defense for Civil GPS Anti-
Spoofing,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of
Navigation, Portland, Oregon, 2011.
[19] Dehghanian, V., Nielsen, J., and Lachapelle, G., “GNSS Spoof-
ing Detection Based on Receiver C/No Estimates,” Proceedings
of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of Navigation, Nashville,
Tennessee, 2012.
[20] Lorenzo, D. S. D., Gautier, J., Rife, J., Enge, P., and Akos, D.,
“Adaptive Array Processing for GPS Interference Rejection,”
Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of Navigation,
Long Beach, CA, Sept. 2005.
[21] Broumandan, A., Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Dehgahanian, V.,
Nielsen, J., and Lachapelle, G., “GNSS Spoofing Detection in
Handheld Receivers based on Signal Spatial Correlation,” Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE/ION PLANS Meeting , Institute of Navi-
gation, Myrtle Beach, SC, April 2012.
[22] Lo, S., DeLorenzo, D., Enge, P., Akos, D., and Bradley, P., “Sig-
nal Authentication,” Inside GNSS , Vol. 0, No. 0, Sept. 2009,
pp. 30–39.
[23] Psiaki, M. L., O’Hanlon, B. W., Bhatti, J. A., and Humphreys,
T. E., “Civilian GPS spoofing detection based on dual-receiver
correlation of military signals,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS
Meeting , Institute of Navigation, Portland, Oregon, 2011.
[24] Psiaki, M., O’Hanlon, B., Bhatti, J., Shepard, D., and
Humphreys, T., “GPS Spoofing Detection via Dual-Receiver
Correlation of Military Signals,” IEEE Transactions on
Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 2012, to be published; avail-
able at http://web.mae.cornell.edu/psiaki/.
[25] O’Hanlon, B., Psiaki, M., Bhatti, J., and Humphreys, T., “Real-
Time Spoofing Detection Using Correlation Between two Civil
GPS Receiver,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Insti-
tute of Navigation, Nashville, Tennessee, 2012.
[26] Humphreys, T. E., “Statement on the vulnerability of
civil unmanned aerial vehicles and other systems to civil
GPS spoofing,” http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.
house.gov/files/Testimony-Humphreys.pdf, July 2012.
[27] Curran, J., Borio, D., Lachapelle, G., and Murphy, C., “Re-
ducing Front-End Bandwidth May Improve Digital GNSS Re-
ceiver Performance,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on,
Vol. 58, No. 4, april 2010, pp. 2399 –2404.
[28] Hegarty, C., “Analytical model for GNSS receiver implementa-
tion losses,” NAVIGATION, Journal of the Institute of Navi-
gation, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2011, pp. 29.
[29] Humphreys, T. E., Ledvina, B. M., Psiaki, M. L., O’Hanlon,
B. W., and Kintner, Jr., P. M., “Assessing the spoofing threat,”
GPS World , Vol. 20, No. 1, Jan. 2009, pp. 28–38.
[30] Humphreys, T. E., Bhatti, J., and Ledvina, B., “The GPS As-
similator: a Method for Upgrading Existing GPS User Equip-
ment to Improve Accuracy, Robustness, and Resistance to
Spoofing,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of
Navigation, Portland, Oregon, 2010.
[31] B.Deshpande, K., Bust, G. S., Clauer, C. R., Kim, H., Macon,
J. E., Humphreys, T. E., Bhatti, J. A., Musko, S. B., Crowley,
G., and Weatherwax, A. T., “Initial GPS Scintillation results
from CASES receiver at South Pole, Antarctica,” Radio Sci-
ence, 2012, in preparation after favorable reviews.
[32] O’Hanlon, B., Psiaki, M., Powell, S., Bhatti, J., Humphreys,
T. E., Crowley, G., and Bust, G., “CASES: A Smart, Compact
GPS Software Receiver for Space Weather Monitoring,” Pro-
ceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of Navigation,
Portland, Oregon, 2011.
[33] Crowley, G., Bust, G. S., Reynolds, A., Azeem, I., Wilder, R.,
O’Hanlon, B. W., Psiaki, M. L., Powell, S., Humphreys, T. E.,
and Bhatti, J. A., “CASES: A Novel Low-Cost Ground-based
DualFrequency GPS Software Receiver and Space Weather
Monitor,” Proceedings of the ION GNSS Meeting , Institute of
Navigation, Portland, Oregon, 2011.
[34] Pany, T., Riedl, B., Winkel, J., Worz, T., and Schwikert, R.,
“Coherent Integration Time: The Longer, the Better,” Inside
GNSS , Vol. 4, No. 6, November/December 2009, pp. 52–61.
15
